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There have been various suggestions of what the criteria are for a justified conscientious refusal 
(e.g. reasonable1,2 and genuine3), but none of them could be assessed with confidence.4 Cowley 
makes a case against using tribunals as a means of assessing the defensibility of physicians’ 
conscientious refusals, arguing that they would be a pointless bureaucratic exercise,5 and instead 
supports the current British arrangement of not requiring objecting doctors to formally defend 
their position. He details two reasons for this: a predicted low number of cases in which an 
objector would lie about her reasons, and a tribunal’s inability to determine whether an objector’s 
claim was genuine or reasonable. I want to focus on the first claim. Following this, I suggest 
approaching this matter by asking what the purpose of tribunals would be.  
 
Cowley claims that the number of cases in which an objector’s reasons for objecting are non-moral 
or based on prejudice would be too few to justify the cost of tribunals. This may be the case, 
though without carefully gathered empirical evidence we cannot be sure. Cowley’s claim is that 
there is little scope for doctors to misuse a conscience clause to object to termination of pregnancy 
for non-moral or prejudiced reasons. He claims that an objection to performing a termination 
would be based on genuine moral conviction (even if simply the ‘beginnings’ of a moral reason), 
since practitioners are unlikely to find termination more gory than other surgical procedures, and 
would not base their refusals on prejudice. He claims this leaves room to disagree only about moral 
or metaphysical aspects of the facts. However, it seems to me a real possibility that doctors could 
use the conscience clause inappropriately, including in termination of pregnancy. 
First, professionals may resist performing terminations for reasons beyond being physically 
repulsed by the surgical procedure itself. Some procedures (gory or otherwise) may be more 
difficult to face than others, and the conscience clause might provide an individual with a means of 
avoiding this discomfort. This has been reported anecdotally in relation to abortion in the UK.6 A 
person may believe she would be morally justified, or even morally obliged, to commit an act and 
yet find it too distressing to perform that action. Consider cases in which people overcome their 
discomfort in order to act morally: a whistle-blower, a person on strike, or someone turning a 
friend in to the police. In these cases the individual may feel she is in some sense betraying those 
around her, but may nevertheless believe she is ultimately doing the right thing. If she were to 
avoid doing so because of discomfort, she would lack the courage of her convictions. Those who 
lack the courage to perform termination despite believing it to be their moral duty may use the 
conscience clause against its intended purpose. 
Second, Cowley also dismisses the possibility of “unjustified biases” because, he claims, the 
objector is non-discriminatory in her refusal. He claims her refusal applies across the board as she 
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will not perform a termination of pregnancy on anybody. However, even a blanket refusal to 
perform terminations of pregnancy is not entirely universal; it is a refusal given only to women. Of 
course a refusal to perform a termination could only be directed at women, but that is not to say 
that an objection could not be based on prejudice, or a lack of empathy and understanding for 
women who find themselves with an unwanted pregnancy. It is also possible that a doctor could 
hold prejudices against particular groups of women. A doctor could object to some terminations 
but not others if she thinks a particular situation justifies it. In a parallel professional setting, there 
is evidence that some pharmacists make conscientious objections to the supply of emergency 
hormonal contraception depending on the woman’s perceived social background,7 thus reaffirming 
that women’s access to reproductive healthcare continues to be influenced by stereotypical 
constructs of female sexuality.8  
Thus, we cannot be sure that an objector’s refusal to perform a termination of pregnancy is not 
based on unjustified prejudice or non-moral reasons. 
Finally, I suggest that in attempting to assess whether tribunals are the answer, we should establish 
what the problem is and what would be the purpose of a tribunal. The desire to test the 
justification for an objector’s refusal is presumably driven by a perceived need to ensure that an 
individual’s decision is morally justifiable. In other words, the reasons for the objection matter. But 
note that health care professionals are not required to justify their reasons for actions that are in 
line with practice. The assumption in these circumstances is that either their reasons for complying 
are morally sound, or there is no need to check the reasons because the practice itself is deemed to 
be morally sound. The conscience clause is a conventional compromise; 9 an objecting doctor must 
refer the patient to a non-objecting colleague, and the objection must not “compromise patient 
care”. 10 If we do not think we need to ask for reasons for acting in line with practice, partly because 
it does not affect the outcome for the patient, then perhaps we do not need to ask for reasons for 
conscientious refusals when it does not affect the outcome for the patient. This is not to say that 
the reasons do not matter, only that a tribunal may not be necessary to meet the overall objectives 
of providing good patient care. In his paper, Cowley makes the assumption that the conscientious 
refusal does not impede the patient from accessing the service she requires (in other words, the 
refusal is in keeping with the conventional compromise). The next question to ask, then, is what, if 
any, formal procedures should be in place for those who conscientiously object and refuse to 
follow the conventional compromise. 
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